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INTRODUCTION
In June 2006, Texas Governor Rick Perry announced a $5 million plan to
install night-vision-equipped webcams along the state's border with Mexico
and to launch a website that would allow virtual minutemen to monitor
portions of the border from their homes and workplaces. People around the
country could call a toll-free hotline to notify law enforcement personnel if they
spotted suspected illegal immigrants on their computer screens.
Around the same time, something subtly related happened. Internet blog
posters began bemoaning a frightening new phenomenon on Skype, the
increasingly successful Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service that allows
its users to make free long-distance calls to other Skype members across the
globe. The phenomenon was telemarketing, and blog commenters began
discussing the obvious solution to the problem: setting one's Skype preferences
so that the user would receive calls only from a preapproved list of callers
known to the Skype user.'
Both these stories emerged roughly contemporaneously with the
appearance of Yochai Benkler's important and influential book, The Wealth of
Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom.3 That seems
appropriate because the two stories offer the beginnings of a rebuttal to
Benkler's eloquent opening argument about the ways in which nonmarket
production is transforming our economic and political systems. Benkler tells us
that "social production" will make us freer, richer, and happier unless our
pesky lawmakers get in its way. But some of the events that accompanied the
publication of his book, along with events that preceded it, suggest that law
may be the least of social production's worries.
In this Review, I scrutinize Benkler's claims that social production is
transforming our world. Along the way, I highlight the dangers that social
1. See Alicia A. Caldwell, Virtual Posse: Texas Governor Proposes Web Cams Along Border,
BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), June 12, 20o6, at C2.
2. See Telemarketing on Skype? Our Worst Fears Being Realised?, Digg, http://digg.com/
software/TelemarketingonSkypeOurworst fears.being-realised_ (last visited Mar. 27,
2007). For many professors of intellectual property law, this development came as no
surprise. In April 2005 at a Fordham Law School conference, Tim Wu predicted that once
Internet telephony lowered the costs of long-distance voice communications to zero, there
would be an onslaught of telemarketing and voice-spam. Wu scared the heck out of the
assembled professors by asking us to envision having our dinners routinely interrupted by
callers informing us of unique business opportunities to recover unclaimed money held in
Nigerian bank accounts.
3. YocHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
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production inevitably faces. Some of these dangers stem from legal rules and
interventions, as Benkler anticipates. But basic economic forces and social
trends pose far greater threats to the flourishing of communications-
technology-driven social production. Finally, I challenge Benkler's most
striking and ambitious claim: his conclusion that social production will lessen
the gap between rich and poor.
Part I restates the core of Benkler's argument and examines its
contributions to the fields of intellectual property and economic theory. In so
doing, it critiques several of Benkler's central premises and perhaps a few
peripheral ones.
Part II examines the primary threats facing social production in the coming
years. The discussion focuses on three bases for skepticism about the
transformational power of social production. First, social production efforts
that seem quite promising when they attract sophisticated, self-selected users
can seem less so when their user bases begin better reflecting the broader
demographics of society. Second, when proprietary firms are competing with
social producers, they can adopt competitive strategies that successfully target
the excess capacity that enables social production. Third, proprietary firms
have already shown the ability to appropriate the strategies of social producers,
with firms like eBay, Linden Labs, and MySpace earning substantial profits off
of the social production of their user bases.
Part III devotes sustained attention to the most audacious portion of
Benkler's book: his claim that the growth of nonmarket production will
diminish the gap between the haves and the have-nots. This Part suggests that
social production writ large could plausibly increase the rich-poor gap, through
the proliferation of socially produced reputation systems. Counterintuitively,
however, this development may be desirable because of its beneficial incentive
effects and its potential to render society more meritocratic. Even if Benkler's
assessment about social production's inherent progressivity is correct, one
wonders whether he has identified the appropriate set of tools for tackling
global inequality.
I. ASSESSING THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS
The Wealth of Networks is an unusually ambitious book, an epic that lends
structure to the economic and technological transformations the world has
already experienced and that provides an imaginative but well-reasoned
account of how these transformations will accelerate in the coming years.
Benkler's methodology is particularly apt for someone who valorizes remix
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culture4 and cumulative innovation. He stands on the shoulders of giants like
Ronald Coase and Richard Titmuss, creatively adapting their insights to
profoundly new circumstances.' In so doing, Benkler shows the reader a vast
intellectual terrain that would not otherwise have been apparent. In this Part, I
provide a brief description of that terrain, peppering that overview with praise
or skepticism when pertinent.
A. On the Shoulders ofAristotle: Explaining Excess Capacity
Benkler has written a book about social production. It is therefore a little
frustrating that he does not provide a clear definition of the term. The closest
Benkler comes to a definition is his statement that social production
encompasses all efforts to create content that are "not based on exclusive
proprietary claims, not aimed toward sales in a market for either motivation or
information, and not organized around property and contract claims to form
firms or market exchanges."
6
Benkler argues, convincingly, that a large portion of the wealth that exists
in society arises from these nonproprietary motivations. A lost tourist might
pay me a dime or a dollar for clear directions to Soldier Field, but I provide the
information free of charge. A wealthy benefactor anonymously donates
millions to ovarian cancer research after having lost a loved one to that terrible
disease. A drifter forgoes Greyhound, hitching a ride with a big rig headed for
Kalamazoo.7 Add up the economic value of these various services, performed
daily around the world, and old-economy social production becomes quite
significant in economic terms. As Benkler observes, excess capacity often drives
social production.' I give clearer directions when I am not rushing to the
4. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
s. The phrase was borrowed from Sir Isaac Newton's letter to Robert Hooke, which stated, "If
I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders of giants." Letter from Isaac Newton to
Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676), reprinted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT, at ii, ii (Post-Italianate ed. 1993). Aptly enough, Newton
borrowed this phrase from earlier writers, and the first known use of the phrase was by
Bernard of Chartres, in approximately 1130. See JOHN OF SALISBURY, THE METALOGICON 167
(David D. McGarry trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1962) (1159). For a discussion, see Joe Yoon,
On the Shoulders of Giants, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/qo162b.shtml
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
6. BENKLER, supra note 3, at 105.
7. These examples are inspired by Benkler's discussion. See id. at 117-18.
8. See id. at ioo, 115.
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airport; the wealthy philanthropist has more money than she can spend on
herself; and the truck driver has extra space in his cab.
While Benkler is right to zero in on the role of excess capacity in facilitating
social production,9 that relationship is one that Aristotle grasped.'" After all,
democracy itself is in many respects a socially produced resource relying on the
leisure time of its citizens as an essential input.' Indeed, socially produced
democratic texts, such as the U.S. Constitution, relied heavily on the
contributions of the landed aristocracy, who had the luxury of ruminating
about the ideal form of government because they could survive on the work
and income of slaves, tenants, and spouses.'2
Of course, Benkler's focus is on the present day, not on the Greek or
Founding eras, and today we see Aristotle's intuition about excess capacity
playing out in many sectors. Users of peer-to-peer networks are more likely to
upload files to anonymous strangers when they have bandwidth to spare.13
Computer enthusiasts are happy to participate in SETI@home, which
harnesses their excess computing power to aid in the search for extraterrestrial
intelligence, because their computers spend hours a day idling and electricity is
rather cheap. 14 And there exist, scattered around the world, Wikipedia
contributors with extra time on their hands and an interest in contributing to a
9. There are, of course, exceptions, and when we observe social production without excess
capacity we are usually watching humanity at its noblest: poverty-stricken families take in
strangers displaced by Hurricane Katrina; firefighters face nearly certain death in an attempt
to save innocent workers in the World Trade Center; ordinary people incur substantial
medical risks to donate bone marrow or even kidneys to strangers needing transplants.
These exceptions, however, are rare enough to underscore the persuasiveness of Benkler's
point. When contributing to a collective good is costly for individuals, anonymous
contributions will be rare.
io. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. VII, ch. IX, at 210-11 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press 1984) (c. 33o B.C.) ("[lt is evident from these things that in the city that is most
finely governed ... the citizens should not live a vulgar or a merchant's way of life, for this
sort of way of life is ignoble and contrary to virtue. Nor, indeed, should those who are going
to be [citizens in such a regime] be farmers; for there is a need for leisure both with a view
to the creation of virtue and with a view to political activities.").
11. So are social norms, which explains why legal scholars who rely on rational actor models
have had to labor to explain norms' existence and enforcement. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER,
LAw AND SOcIAL NORMS (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L.
&ECON. REv. 1 (2001).
12. Indeed, it is useful to consider the Constitution as an example of social production, with
James Madison playing the part of Linus Torvalds.
13. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 86.
14. See id. at 82.
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valuable public good."s There are, to be sure, important differences between the
excess physical capital that drives peer-to-peer sharing and the excess human
capital that drives Wikipedia -differences explored more fully below.1
6
B. On the Shoulders of Titmuss: A Theory of Social Production
If we understand social production to encompass all forms of production
that do not rely on rights-based exclusion, then Benkler's framework identifies
six types of social production. Three of these are driven by proprietary motives.
These include the "Scholarly Lawyer" strategy, employed by people like
Howard Bashman of the How Appealing blog,1 7 who uses his terrific and free
blog to generate clients and name recognition; the "Know-How" strategy,
whereby firms develop and hoard in-house innovations that they use to create
more competitive markets; and the "Learning Network," such as the A.P. wire
service, which is a cooperative venture funded by a number of newspapers."
Although Benkler spends a lot of time discussing Scholarly Lawyers, his book
largely ignores the Know-How and Learning Network models. This is
appropriate. After all, the Know-How model usually relies on trade secret law,
a rights-based exclusion system, to guard against misappropriation of
innovations by ex-employees or third parties. And learning networks have long
been subjected to scrutiny by legal scholars, particularly those who work in the
antitrust area.19
Benkler's other three categories are the most interesting. These are what he
calls nonexclusion-nonmarket production strategies. Benkler dubs the first
approach "Joe Einstein," reflecting the motivations of the individual who
produces something valuable and then gives that valuable resource away,
perhaps for altruistic reasons, or perhaps to enhance his reputation. Two other
nonmarket approaches include the "Los Alamos" approach, which seems
merely to be the "Know-How" approach employed by the government, and the
"Limited Sharing Network," whereby a small group of individuals (such as a
law school faculty) help each other become better Joe Einsteins (by reading and
is. See id. at 375.
16. See infra Sections II.A-B.
17. How Appealing, http://howappealing.law.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
18. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 43 tbl.2.1.
19. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30 JUPMETRICS J. 253
(199o); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REv.
1041 (1996); Michelle K. Lee & Mavis K. Lee, Comment, High Technology Consortia: A
Panacea for America's Technological Competitiveness Problems?, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 335 (1991).
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commenting on each other's papers)." Again, though, the Los Alamos and
Limited Sharing Networks fade into the background of Benkler's book, and he
focuses most of his attention on Joe Einsteins. Really, then, Benkler's book is
about two phenomena: the more altruistic Joe Einstein and the less altruistic
Scholarly Lawyer.
Recent events, such as the YouTube lonelygirlh5 affair,2 ' indicate that
apparent Joe Einsteins are often Scholarly Lawyers in disguise. Sensibly,
Benkler does not seem to want to police the boundaries of his typology too
rigidly. Forms of social production like blogging, open source programming,
and peer-to-peer file sharing seem characterized by a mix of motivations, be
they altruistic, status-oriented, or proprietary. For example, many open source
programmers see participation in an open source project as a valuable resume
builder and a promising pathway to startup venture capital funding, or are
encouraged to contribute to the project by their employers. Other contributors
seem genuinely motivated by a desire to solve a vexing technical problem,
participate in a team effort, or help others." Scholars argue about what sorts of
motivations predominate in particular settings, and these are indeed
interesting research questions, but the joint presence of some other-regarding
preferences and absence of immediate market transactions seems like a clear
enough basis for characterizing the "social production" phenomenon. That
said, to the extent that some participants in social production projects are
merely seeking delayed returns from the marketplace (i.e., enhanced
reputations that they can later convert into employment or endorsement
opportunities), social production seems increasingly evolutionary and
decreasingly revolutionary.
Benkler's next claim is that social production is often a better method for
creating wealth than relying on old-fashioned incentives, such as monetary
payments and exclusive private property rights.2 3 As Benkler notes, Titmuss
made essentially the same claim about the blood "market" in 1970, arguing that
a regime relying on voluntary donations would produce a more reliable supply
2o. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 43 tbl.2.1.
21. See Tom Zeller Jr., Lonelygirli5: Prank, Art or Both?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, § 4 (Week
in Review), at 16 (describing the controversy created when an actress posed as a home-
schooled teenager broadcasting to a very large audience on YouTube).
22. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197,
213-20 (2002); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 241, 26o-81.
23. See BENKLER, SUpra note 3, at 115-16.
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for transfusions than a system in which people were paid for blood. 4 Note that
on Titmuss's account, too, the presence of excess capacity is what makes the
altruistic regime work: donors have more blood than their bodies need and are
willing to spend one half-hour or so at a blood bank to do a good deed.2"
Titmuss's conclusions have been second-guessed in the intervening years,26
and in light of recent advances in blood screening, the question of whether an
optimal blood provision regime relies on paid or charitable contributions is
once again debatable.
With respect to a great deal of information content, however, Benkler
argues that the question of optimal incentives is not a close one: social
production does better than market production. 7  To make this
counterintuitive argument, Benkler relies on theory and empirics. The
theoretical claim is straightforward and plausible. Benkler says that in the
creative industries, outputs are also inputs28 For example, when Salman
Rushdie writes a novel, he creates a valuable literary work. But the characters,
linguistic flourishes, themes, and plot devices from Rushdie's novel can be
appropriated by other authors to create their own novels. So whereas we
intuitively understand that had Rushdie been granted insufficient intellectual
property rights, he might not have written Midnight's Children, Benkler would
stress that if Rushdie had been granted too strong intellectual property rights,
then he might have used those rights to prevent other writers who were
influenced by his work, such as Arundhati Roy and Jhumpa Lahiri, from
making their own contributions to literature. Copyright law has long
recognized the "outputs as inputs" point via doctrines such as the idea-
expression dichotomy, and the same logic explains both patent law's relatively
short patent term and its requirement of nonobviousness.' 9 Of course, this
24. Id. at 93 (citing RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY (1970)).
25. When donation is more cumbersome, as with bone marrow, it is far less common. See
generally Roberta G. Simmons et al., The Self-Image of Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors, 34 J.
HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 285 (1993) (characterizing bone marrow donation as an
exceptionally altruistic act, in light of the associated pain and risks).
26. See Philippe Fontaine, Blood, Politics, and Social Science: Richard Titmuss and the Institute of
Economic Affairs, 1957-1973, 93 Isis 401, 423-33 (2002). For a recent assessment of Titmuss's
theoretical contributions and shortcomings, see Robert Pinker, From Gifi Relationships to
Quasi-Markets: An Odyssey Along the Policy Paths of Altruism and Egoism, 40 Soc. POL'Y &
ADMIN. 10 (2006).
27. See BENKLER,SUpra note 3, at 116-17, 3o5-o6.
28. Id. at 37.
2g. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 523-24 (1981) (discussing cumulative
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theoretical argument does not answer the hard question of how much
intellectual property protection is optimal. But it does introduce a useful sort of
Laffer curve to the analysis of innovation policy.
Benkler relies on the empirical work of other scholars to suggest that
current patent and copyright protections may be too strong to encourage
optimal innovation. He is particularly impressed with the scholarship of
Harvard's Josh Lerner:
Lerner looked at changes in intellectual property law in sixty countries
over a period of 150 years. He studied close to three hundred policy
changes, and found that, both in developing countries and in
economically advanced countries that already have patent law,
patenting both at home and abroad by domestic firms of the country
that made the policy change, a proxy for their investment in research
and development, decreases slightly when patent law is strengthened!
The implication is that when a country . . . increases its patent
protection, it slightly decreases the level of investment in innovation by
local firms.3 °
Lerner is a first-rate economist, and his work is interesting and informative.
But other first-rate economists have used different methodologies to determine
what effects strong intellectual property laws have had on innovation, and they
have reached very different conclusions.
MIT's Petra Moser, for example, has examined the diffusion of innovations
during the nineteenth century in two recent papers. Her 2005 paper in the
American Economic Review studied the innovations that were highlighted at the
1851 and 1876 World's Fairs.31 She concluded that in nations without patent
laws- such as Switzerland and Denmark in 1851, and Switzerland and Holland
in 1876-there was little innovation in industries like manufacturing and
agricultural machinery, in which trade secrecy is a poor substitute for patent
protection, and more innovation in industries like food processing and
scientific instruments, in which trade secrets do provide a relatively effective
means for maintaining a monopoly on innovation.32 Thus, patent protections
innovation in the copyright context); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29
(discussing cumulative innovation in the patent context).
3o. BENKLER, supra note 3, at 39 (footnote omitted).
31. Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century
World's Fairs, 95 Am. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005).
32. See id. at 1231-32.
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do seem to encourage successful innovation. A related paper suggested that in
British industries in which firms relied heavily on patent protection,
innovations were more geographically dispersed than in those industries in
which patent protection was unavailable or not often sought.33 On the basis of
these data, Moser concluded that strong patent protections served an
information-forcing purpose and enhanced socially desirable knowledge
spillover across England.34
The research results obtained by Moser, like those obtained by Lerner, are
entirely consistent with economic theory. Lerner's findings are driven by the
insight that creative outputs are also inputs.35 Moser's findings are driven by
the business reality that the choice for a firm is usually not between patenting
an invention and giving it away for free. Rather, the choice is often between
patenting the invention and relying on some other form of protection-e.g.,
maintaining it as a trade secret. If the firm opts for trade secret protection, then
it need not disclose the invention either to the public at large or to competitors,
and its monopoly on the innovation may last longer than the patent term.36 A
firm possessing a valuable innovation as a trade secret may take steps to limit
the exodus of its employees to competitor firms, use encryption and physical
security measures to guard the innovation, spread out the insights constituting
a valuable trade secret among several employees so that no individual knows
the entire secret, and try to prevent competitors and the public from learning
about the innovation's very existence. For all these reasons, trade secret
protection typically results in less diffusion of innovations than does reliance
on patent law.
37
33. See Petra Moser, Do Patent Laws Help To Diffuse Innovations? Evidence from the
Geographic Localization of Innovation and Production in 19th-Century England (July lo,
2005), http://web.mit.edu/moser/wwwoc5o7nber.pdf.
34. See id. at 21-23.
35- See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 37-39, 49.
36. David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991,
at 61, 63.
37. An important argument cuts the other way. Trade secrets, unlike product patents, are not
protected against reverse engineering by competitors. Thus it may be that although trade
secrets curtail the diffusion of information about innovations, they enhance the net
innovation that occurs in society. Of course, firms interested in guarding against reverse
engineering have begun turning to contractual provisions that prohibit reverse engineering,
and the courts have generally held these provisions enforceable. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Benkler's book does not discuss trade secret protection at all"S- a puzzling
omission in a 473-page book about innovation policy. If patent protections are
weakened, as Benkler advocates, then some firms will be driven toward a social
production business model, but some firms will be driven toward a trade
secrets business model.39 Even in the "new" economy, it is hard to believe that
the former trend would trump the latter. And one can construct a compelling
argument that society is worse off if more of its innovations are protected as
trade secrets than as patents. Indeed, that persuasive argument explains the
presence of patent laws in every developed nation on Earth. 40
In short, the empirical evidence concerning the net effects on innovation of
strengthening intellectual property protections is ambiguous. So are the
conclusions of economic theory. Maybe economists will coalesce around a
particular view in a decade or century, but so far a lack of consensus exists
among careful scholars.4 At present, it seems likely that there are some
industries in which a proprietary model based on exclusive property rights
maximizes innovation and others in which that model diminishes innovation.42
There are places in the book where Benkler seems ready to concede as much. 43
But there are other places where Benkler gets ahead of himself. For example,
Benkler summarizes the literature in this way:
Let us call a rule set that is looser from the perspective of access to
existing information resources Rule Set A, and a rule set that imposes
38. The book mentions trade secrets once in passing, in the context of a discussion about vote
tallying machines and their proprietary software. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 227.
39. Trade secret protection is probably the most common "substitute" for patent protection, but
it is not the only one. Other options include leveraging patents for complementary products,
aggressive branding campaigns that rely on trademark law, and efforts to appropriate large
first mover advantages.
40. See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 109-10 (2000); Stephen P. Marks, Tying
Prometheus Down: The International Law of Human Genetic Manipulation, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
115, 119-20 (2002).
41. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 471, 494-95 (2000) ("The analysis reviewed here claims that strengthening IPRS
systems could raise or lower economic growth, though the relationships would be complex
and dependent on circumstances."). Maskus reviewed some of the empirical literature, see id.
at 476-95, and concluded that the limited evidence suggests that stronger intellectual
property rights promote economic growth and development, but only as "part of a coherent
and broad set of complementary" trade, antitrust, and other economic policies, id. at 502.
42. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003)
(arguing that patent law does and should look very different across industries).
4.- See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 3, at 41, 49.
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higher costs on access to information inputs Rule Set B.... [I]t is quite
likely that adopting B would depress information production and
innovation, even if it were intended to increase the production of
information by, for example, strengthening copyright or patent. 44
Broad generalizations like these are in my view premature, especially when we
are confronted with a growing empirical economics literature that has achieved
decidedly mixed results.
C. On the Shoulders of Coase: A Framework for Understanding the Choice of
Production Regimes
Benkler's primary contribution in the early chapters of the book is not
empirical. He relies on economists like Lerner to do the heavy lifting here.
What Benkler adds to the discussion is a terrific theoretical insight, which is to
extend Coasean economic analysis of the firm to social production via the
commons. Here, Benkler nicely recounts his wonderful 2002 article, Coase's
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, which appeared in the pages of
this law journal.4"
Ronald Coase is famous for many things, 46 but his scholarship on the
nature of the firm ranks among his most important achievements. Coase saw
that a proprietary firm inevitably performed some essential tasks in-house and
relied on outside contractors, consultants, agents, or suppliers for other equally
essential tasks. What determined which tasks were performed in-house or
externally? Coase argued that the decision to produce in-house was a product
of transaction costs. In a competitive market, if the transaction costs of dealing
with outside agents or vendors were particularly high (say, because of the
dangers of trade secret misappropriation, or the high costs of crafting contracts
that dealt with uncertainties and unforeseen events, or the dangers associated
with strategic behavior), then a firm would be inclined to perform the task in-
house. If, by contrast, these and other transaction costs were low, then the firm
44. Id. at 305-06 (emphasis added).
45. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE. L.J. 369
(2002). In Coase's Penguin, Benkler shied away from characterizing social production as a
"more efficient model of production for information and culture," stating that "[w] hen peer
production will surpass the advantages that the other two models may have in triggering or
directing human behavior through the relatively reliable and reasonably well-understood
triggers of money and hierarchy is a matter for more detailed study." Id. at 381.
46. Extraneous citation to R-H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &ECON. 1 (196o).
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could be expected to outsource the work via the marketplace.47 Coase, in short,
suggested that in a competitive market, firms are structured the way they are
because of transaction costs.
Benkler was the first scholar to realize that just as transaction costs will
sometimes dictate that some aspects of production be outsourced to other
firms, they will sometimes dictate that production occur outside of the
proprietary marketplace altogether. This is where social production comes in.
Some resources can be produced most efficiently neither in-house nor by an
outsourced firm, but by a large group of like-minded altruists, voluntarily
contributing to their creation. Typically, the transaction cost savings of using
social production depend on the reduced costs of identifying the person who
can best accomplish a modular task within a larger project and of negotiating
terms of employment with that person. 48 After all, the best available person for
the job may well self-identify, and the contributor invariably will receive credit
but no cash.49
One of Benkler's strongest examples of social production provides a nice
illustration of its possibilities. Astronomers at the University of California are
engaged in the process of searching for extraterrestrial intelligence by analyzing
radio astronomy signals for patterns that might indicate the presence of life
outside our solar system. This is a task requiring enormous computational
capacities. To that end, the brilliant folks at Berkeley had a neat idea: distribute
a free screensaver to millions of computer owners. When these computer
owners used their machines to type e-mails or play video games, SETI@home
would make itself invisible. But when the computer users went to school,
work, or sleep, their SETI@home screensaver would launch, and their
machines would begin downloading small number-crunching problems that
47. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 40-47 (1988).
48. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 11o-15.
4g. Benkler recognizes the problem of inaccurate self-assessment, whereby the hapless
contributor volunteers for the difficult project, which he will execute poorly. See id. at 112.
Benkler sensibly suggests that the role of peer review in social production is to reduce the
costs of inaccurate self-assessment, but such solutions are imperfect. Waiting for peer
review to correct inaccurate self-assessment and to reopen a project for other volunteers
imposes substantial production delays. Indeed, it may be that the proprietary market's
approaches to this problem (e.g., headhunters, requests for proposals, management
consultants, and market discipline) are often the superior approach. There may also be
many circumstances in which another contributor could have done a far better job on a
modular task but is deterred from doing so by the fact that someone else already has begun
the effort. Cf. Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and Related
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005) (discussing the implications of redundancy in
copyright law).
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would keep the CPUs occupied until their owners returned."0 Once a notebook
computer found the solution to one problem, it would upload that solution to
the SETI@home servers and download a new problem. By utilizing the excess
capacity of millions of notebooks and desktop machines, Berkeley created the
fastest supercomputer in the world-a machine that ran 75% faster than the
largest single supercomputer heretofore invented, IBM's Blue Gene/L. s1
Berkeley might have gone a different route. Just as it might have built a
single supercomputer or leased IBM's machine, it could have paid scattered
computer owners for the temporary use of their excess capacity. But Benkler
asserts that either approach would have been inefficient.5 2 IBM had lots of
other uses for Blue Gene/L, making it a valuable and scarce commodity, and
negotiating with individual users might have gotten complicated and
expensive. Should computer owners with faster microprocessors be paid more?
Would Berkeley negotiate with arbitragers? Instead of paying computer users
for resources and incurring substantial transaction costs trying to answer these
questions, Berkeley just accepted donations from anyone willing to contribute
to a worthy collective cause: locating Wookies, Klingons, or other alien life
forms in outer space. Discussions of the SETI@home program first appeared
in the legal literature as far back as 20oo. 53 Benkler's important contribution,
though, is to show us a world in which projects like SETI@home are
ubiquitous. Indeed, he anticipates that ours will become a world in which
SETI@home is the norm and IBM's Blue Gene/L is the exception.
Where are these ubiquitous SETIs@home? Benkler sees them,
convincingly, in Wikipedia and Slashdot. s4 More controversially, he identifies
similar forms of social production in peer-to-peer file swapping networks,
open source programming, the World Wide Web, massive multi-user online
games like Second Life, the blogosphere, Internet search engine algorithms,
experimental crop breeding, and WiFi Internet access."5 Indeed, the dangers of
writing a book about the Internet are exemplified by the emergence of new
phenomena, such as podcasting, YouTube, Librivox, Digg, and MySpace, that
seem to illustrate Benkler's thesis but were not at the forefront of popular
50. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 82.
51. See id. at 81-82.
52. See id. at 114-15.
53. See, e.g., Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of
Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 54.
54. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 70-74, 76-80.
55. See id. at 63-90, 216-25, 337-44. These examples are less clearly characterized as instances of
social production in that market incentives may play a greater part in their success than the
fact that they utilize nonmarket production. See infra Section II.C.
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discourse when he was writing his manuscript. Assessing the terrain, and the
buzz generated by some of these innovations, one gets the distinct impression
that Benkler is on to something big.
Taking his argument further, Benkler says that the social production
revolution will have demand-side effects as well as supply-side effects. More
precisely, active consumers of creative content differ from passive consumers of
creative content. The latter are being manipulated by large media
conglomerates that will provide mind-numbingly banal, "lowest-common-
denominator" content s6 designed to lull consumers into a mood that will make
them receptive to commercial advertisers' messages.17 The former are more
demanding of challenging, provocative, and stimulating content, and they are
willing to take control over the environments that were spoiled when content
creators let commercial interests trump their artistic integrity.s Benkler gets
worked up about the vapidity of American pop culture here, noting that if
music fans themselves can be tasked with identifying breakthrough acts,
instead of relying on record labels and radio station conglomerates to do the
sorting for them, "fewer mediocre musicians with attractive physiques will be
sold as 'geniuses."'' 9
I do not disagree with Benkler's assessment that the television programs,
music albums, and books that are most widely watched, listened to, and read
by Americans are usually pretty bad. I will admit to elitism on that front and
lay the blame where Benkler is reluctant to place it-with the consumers who
refused to watch, say, Arrested Development despite the pleas of television critics
across the land.6o In any event, I do not wish to rehash the high-culture versus
low-culture debates here. My purpose is more modest. Namely, I want to
suggest that although his articulation of these demand-side arguments is
thought-provoking, Benkler has misidentified the villain on this score.
Take television programming, about which Benkler spills the most ink. It is
not the case that the market provides inadequate incentives for the production
of excellent television content aimed at engaging intelligent viewers. The cable
S6. BENKLER, supra note 3, at 165.
S7. Id. at 170.
s8. See id. at 171-74.
sg. Id. at 426.
6o. See Allessandra Stanley, A Quick End to the Cult Series That Lived Up to Its Name, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1o, 2006, at E30.
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network HBO is extremely profitable.61 It also produces the types of television
programs the absence of which Benkler bemoans: stimulating, creative,
provocative, critically acclaimed, and wonderfully addictive shows such as The
Sopranos, Six Feet Under, Deadwood, and The Wire. 62 These shows are also quite
expensive to produce relative to their network television peers.
HBO is not PBS. Money drives its decision-making. But because
subscriptions and DVD sales, not ads, provide its primary revenue stream,6" it
need not force content producers to stop the narrative flow every eight minutes
so that advertisements can run. And because it is not a broadcast network, it
need not comply with restrictive FCC regulations regarding profanity and
sexual content. The Wire has never attracted sparkling Nielsen ratings, but its
audience is strongly devoted to the show and is willing to ante up substantial
monthly subscription fees.6 4 The Wire thus avoided the fate of Arrested
Development, which had a small but similarly devoted audience, because the
economics of cable television work reasonably well for "long tail" content and
the economics of broadcast television do not.6" To the extent that Benkler's
attack on the quality of broadcast television offerings is correct, it suggests that
the market is ripe for a shift to HBO's subscription model or even to a pay-per-
view model, both of which have become increasingly viable mechanisms for
converting eyeballs into cash as a result of recent advances in digital rights
management. It is far easier to imagine such developments in the marketplace
than Benkler's scenario of market-driven television's displacement by amateur
uploads to YouTube.66
61. See Maureen Ryan, While You Were Out... Tony, the Television World Changed, from New
Sunday Competition to a Digital Video World, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2006, § 7 (Arts &
Entertainment), at i.
6a. See, e.g., Bill Carter, The Emmys: HBO Batters Broadcasters, N.Y. TiMEs, July 16, 2004, at El.
Of course, not everything HBO touches turns to gold. Consider The Mind of the Married
Man, K Street, The Comeback, and Big Love.
63. Ryan, supra note 61.
64. See Joshua Chaffin, Cult Hit Shows Are Hitting a Right Note as Strategy Pulls in the Viewers,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006, at 27.
65. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF
MORE 164-67, 194-96 (2006).
66. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 168 ("The high-production-cost Hollywood movie or
television series are the threatened species.").
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D. On the Shoulders of Rawls: Distributional and Political Consequences of
Social Production
In the book's most ambitious chapter, Benkler asserts that social
production will do more than alter the production of intellectual property
content. It will also help reduce resource disparities between the world's haves
and have-nots, creating a better society under the frameworks put forward by
John Rawls and other liberal theorists.6 ' Benkler's book rises to the challenge
of those who assert that scholars interested in issues of social justice should
direct their energies to things other than intellectual property law. This
challenge asks why the Somali subsistence farmer or the Bolivian slum dweller
should care about frivolous luxuries like Wikipedia or massive multi-user
online games.68
Such a critique has intuitive appeal. Of course, the same criticism can be
launched at most law scholarship: what difference does Sarbanes-Oxley or the
separation of powers or customary international law make in the lives of the
world's billions of poor people? Most legal scholars would respond, "not
much," and move on, suggesting that the legal questions to which they devote
their time still affect enough people to be worth the enterprise. Benkler is not
so quick to surrender. And good for him, because chapter nine, in which he
defends the claim that "information policy has become a critical element of
development policy, ' ' 69 is the most exhilarating part of his book.
Benkler makes two persuasive claims in this chapter. First, he notes that the
market and intellectual property systems of incentives largely determine which
diseases are targeted by pharmaceutical companies. Would the marginal dollar
spent on a cure for malaria do more "good" than the marginal dollar spent on
an acne treatment? Certainly, by virtually any defensible measure of social
welfare. But malaria kills poor Africans and acne affects American teenagers
from affluent families, so research and development resources flow toward
therapies for the relatively trivial medical condition.70  If rewards for
67. See id. at 303-08.
68. Id. at 301.
69. Id. at 302.
7o. See id. at 318. Of course, the story here is more complicated than Benkler's telling suggests.
Low per capita GDP in the parts of the world affected by malaria may explain
pharmaceutical firms' lack of investment in malaria research. But so might the (legitimate)
fear that if pharmaceutical firms do develop an effective treatment, their patent rights will be
expropriated by developing world governments. And who can blame them? Faced with a
disease, like HI-V, that threatens large swaths of the population and with a shortfall of funds
to pay for the cure, a democratically elected government official would be sorely tempted to
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pharmaceutical innovation were not so heavily dependent on patent revenues,
which are in turn dependent on consumers' respective abilities to pay, we
might well see an allocation of research and development dollars that saved
more lives and better reflected society's moral intuitions.
Second, Benkler points out that information outputs can be particularly
valuable for developing nations. Widespread access to science and engineering
texts, without more, will not improve a country's lot, but the availability of
such resources combined with other investments in education might help a
country modernize its economy in a generation or two. 7' Genetically modified
crops can go a very long way toward preventing malnutrition in the developing
world, but many crops that achieve much higher per-acre yields are proprietary
and hence unavailable to most farmers in developing countries. 72 And mass
media monopolies can help keep dictators in power. The decentralized Internet
poses a fundamental challenge to authoritarian regimes because it raises the
possibility that an eloquent dissident will be heard and echoed. 73
Most imaginatively, Benkler wonders about the possibility of something
like malariavaccine@home, whereby computer users around the world devote
excess computing capacity to the modeling and number-crunching that is
essential to modern pharmaceutical research and development.74 If market
economics drive firms to invest in acne improvements rather than malaria, but
people with computing resources to spare view malaria as the greater social
problem, then distributed computing and social production might offset the
marketplace's questionable priorities. Both of Benkler's arguments suggest that
reforming domestic and international intellectual property laws can
significantly reduce the rich-poor gap. I say much more about these claims in
Part III.
Benkler's final chapters are more orthodox than the earlier ones.
Essentially, Benkler takes the American and European governments to task for
a series of policy decisions that privilege market production over social
production. Here, Benkler weighs in on many contemporary debates: the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (he's against it); the Copyright Term
Extension Act (he's against it); the litigation against peer-to-peer file swappers
authorize generic manufacturers to enter the domestic market, notwithstanding their
inability to obtain a license from the patent holder. Because developing nations cannot
credibly commit to a nonappropriation policy, pharmaceutical firms are deterred from
investing in badly needed therapies.
71. See id. at 326.
72. See id. at 336-43.
73. See id. at 266-71.
74. See id. at 351-52.
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(he's against it); trademark antidilution protection (he's against it); database
protection (he's against it); and international intellectual property
harmonization (he's against it, or at least against its recent manifestations).
You get the idea. Benkler does not like much of what Congress has been doing
in the realm of intellectual property protection, and he is equally skeptical that
courts and international entities can get it right. He forthrightly says he does
not know whether these policies will succeed in thwarting the social
production revolution, but he worries that they will do a great deal of
damage.75
I agree with much of what Benkler says in these chapters, emphatically so
in the case of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act. But Benkler's views
about these subjects hardly differentiate him from the majority of intellectual
property professors who write about these issues. 76 Many of us share Benkler's
normative priors, empirical hunches, and dim view of recent congressional
action. What is particularly interesting about these chapters is what Benkler
fails to say.
Benkler sees the anti-social-production bias of congressional action as the
product of naked interest group rent-seeking. 77 The creative industries have
powerful lobbyists, and the public domain does not. Content creators can
organize easily, but consumers cannot. 78 It is a familiar public choice refrain.
Curiously, Benkler devotes chapter ten of his book to discussing the Internet's
effect on social relations, arguing that the Internet actually strengthens ties
among people. And Benkler painstakingly assembles evidence indicating that
the Internet might help galvanize political action: "wired" neighborhoods seem
to be fertile ground for political action;79 blogosphere reactions have helped
alter the national political discourse on several occasions;"0 and Meetup.com is
a website that helps like-minded citizens find each other and organize
75. See id. at 471-72.
76. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES To KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE
OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33; Dan
L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARv. J.L.
& TECH. 41 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DuKE L.J. 1783 (2002).
7. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 393.
78. See, e.g., id. at 407-08, 413-14.
79. See id. at 363.
go. See, e.g., id. at 220-25 (describing the blogosphere discussion of the Sinclair Broadcast
Group's anti-John Kerry documentary); id. at 225-33 (the Diebold Election Systems
controversy); id. at 263-64 (the Trent Lott scandal).
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politically.81 In light of these trends, it is difficult to understand why Benkler
shies away from the claim that social production will have as important an
effect on political life as it has had on consumer culture.82 Indeed, Benkler
devotes just a few sentences to Meetup, even though it was famously used by
Howard Dean supporters in the 2004 presidential primaries to launch their
candidate to the front of a crowded Democratic field.8" As published, chapter
ten seems like a puzzling detour from the core of Benkler's argument.
Suggesting that the Internet will alter the political calculus in Washington and
state capitals seems like the sensible means of connecting the dots.
Someone reading Benkler's analysis of social networks and social ties
naturally will wonder whether Congress will have such an easy time re-
extending the copyright term in 2018, when a vast swath of copyrights are set
to expire. By that time, there will be, on Benkler's account, a large community
of content producers who remix audio and video content and an even larger
community of people to enjoy these remixes.84 The Internet and subsequent
communication technologies will have helped strengthen social ties, thus
lowering the costs of assembling political movements. Every trend that Benkler
identifies suggests that the political dynamics of copyright term extension in
2018 will be very different from what they were in 1998. But Benkler, who is
rather optimistic about almost everything else, is curiously silent about
whether social production will irreversibly alter the political balance of power."
It is an argument that others have embraced," so its absence from Benkler's
text is conspicuous. Maybe there is a strong basis for Benkler's uncharacteristic
pessimism here, but having been persuaded by much of his analysis, I am
dying to know his reasons.
81. See id. at 368.
82. For a brief discussion of the organizations that are currently blowing into the wind, see id. at
455-56.
83. See Matea Gold, Where Political Influence Is Only a Keyboard Away, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003,
at A41.
84. Cf. BENKLER, supra note 3, at 418-28 (discussing the rise of music sharing communities and
the possible growth of video sharing communities).
85. See id. at 442-43.
86. See, e.g., JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC
155-56 (2001); JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: DEMOCRACY, THE
INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING (2004); Jeffrey M. Ayres, From the Streets
to the Internet: The Cyber-Diffitsion of Contention, 566 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132
(1999); Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, So ADMIN. L. REV. 277
(1998).
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Before concluding this brief sketch of Benkler's argument, I want to
mention a final reason why readers interested in intellectual property and
information economics should read Benkler's book. It is free. Benkler has made
his book available under a Creative Commons license, encouraging users to
remix it, improve it, convert it to a book on tape, or merely read it without
paying.8 ' Benkler's decision is laudable and refreshing, and his ability to
convince Yale University Press to abide by such an arrangement is a big deal.
The publication of Benkler's book under these terms promises to set a
precedent that will make similar arrangements more common in the future,
and that is certainly a heartening development.
II. THE HEALTH OF NETWORKS: DANGERS FACED BY SOCIAL
PRODUCTION
Benkler has chosen to write his book fairly early in the life cycle of
communications-technology-driven social production. And his book is clearly
bullish on social production, to the extent that he sometimes underestimates
important pitfalls that social production is already facing or will face in the
future. In this Part, I discuss several challenges to social production- those
posed by changing user populations, economic responses by market producers
who are competing with social producers, and the possibility that proprietary
firms will appropriate the methods of social producers. Taken together, these
challenges are daunting, and they might push social production to the
peripheries of the new economy.
A. March of the Trolls
The success of many socially produced resources, such as open source
programming projects, is explained by their targeting of highly sophisticated
and skilled users for participation.88 Peer-to-peer file swapping applications
initially relied on goodwill and reciprocity to encourage uploading,8 9 and then
began mandating uploads or providing incentives to share content (via
87. At present, users can do so here: http://www.benkler.org/wealth of networks/index.php/
DownloadPDFs of the-book (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
88. See Lerner & Tirole, supra note 22, at 204-07.
89. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation
on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505, 547-75 (2003).
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prioritized downloads for users who uploaded frequently).9 Wikipedia, which
Benkler discusses at length, initially let anyone add or edit encyclopedia entries,
and then began requiring authors to register before adding entries, based on
the fear that false, malicious, or libelous content was being posted by people
with axes to grind. 91 Internet chat rooms or blog comments began with useful
discussions, and then saw their initial audience driven out by spammers,
flamers, trolls, and know-nothings. It is a common tale, and it has afflicted a
large portion of the Internet.
There is an important lesson in these trends. Benkler's colleague Henry
Smith has noted that when society regulates a collective resource, it has two
sorts of options: governance or exclusion. 92 Suppose a community runs a
weekend food festival in a public park. It can opt for a governance strategy,
letting anyone set up a booth and then regulating the behavior of vendors (e.g.,
by having a health inspector conduct random checks of each vendor's
operations, by regulating the fat content of food that can be served, or by
controlling the profit margins of each vendor). Alternatively, it can choose an
exclusion strategy, keeping out disreputable or unknown vendors but then
giving vendors relatively free rein at the festival (e.g., by admitting only
vendors affiliated with a Zagat-rated or Michelin-starred restaurant or by
requiring every admitted vendor to be a member of the Better Business
Bureau). Plainly, the optimal regulatory strategy will sometimes involve a mix
of governance and exclusion, but Smith's chief insight has broad application:
you can control what users of the resource do or, as a substitute, control what
kinds of people get to use the resource.
What does our food festival have to do with Benkler's book? The reason so
many Internet-based forms of social production seem initially promising has to
do with selection effects. Many web-based discussion forums thrive based on
the expertise of a small number of contributors. But if a forum achieves
notoriety in the mass media via links from popular Internet portals, the
successful forum will experience an inevitable increase in the quantity of posts
and a decrease in the average quality of posts. Trolls will push out the sensible
go. See, e.g., Answers.com, File Sharing, http://www.answers.com/topic/file-sharing (last
visited Mar. 27, 2007); Raymond, How To Cheat BitTorrent Ratio by Spoofing, Raymond.CC
Blog, July 27, 2006, http://www.raymond.cc/blog/archives/20o6/o7/27/how-to-cheat-
bittorrent-ratio-by-spoofing/.
gi. See Will Wikipedia Mean the End of Traditional Encyclopedias?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 12,
20o6, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB1 5756239753455284-A4hdSU1xZOC9Y9PFhJ
ZV16jFILM_2007o91i.html.
92. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).
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discussants in short order.93 This will cause the proprietors of these websites to
begin implementing onerous governance rules, such as deleting off-topic
comments, instituting content guidelines, prohibiting anonymous posts, and
the like. Pure social production can work very well for a relatively small group
of people who toil obscurely. But once the product of their labors becomes
economically valuable or politically influential, the riff-raff will be drawn in,
and the quality of the collective resource might well decline as a result. More
generally, quality-diminishing users tend to stay away from obscure or
technical resources. After all, what is the point of being a troll where there are
few people around to read your comments? If a socially produced resource
matures and goes mainstream, it becomes an increasingly inviting target for
attack.
An important question that Benkler does not adequately confront is
whether socially produced resources are as resilient to malicious users as are
market resources. The answer to that question is by no means clear. If a
proprietary firm discovers that one of its employees is not contributing her fair
share to the firm's bottom line, that employee can be fired. In egregious cases,
involving employee sabotage and the like, blackballing and litigation provide
further sanctioning opportunities, and the availability of these sanctions
substantially constrains employee misbehavior. These strategies are not nearly
as effective in preventing misbehavior within social production projects: the
producers are not employees, they may well be anonymous or pseudonymous,
and litigation will not be a practical option for various reasons.
Benkler addresses these important issues in his book, providing an
interesting case study of Slashdot's largely successful strategy for filtering and
accreditation, which is designed to marginalize the contributions of quality-
diminishing users. To facilitate the removal of useless or off-topic
commentary, Slashdot has developed a "karma" system, whereby users
evaluate other users' comments for their contributions to the collective
discourse. Comments deemed informative or humorous will generate good
karma points for the users who post them, and comments deemed
uninformative or off-topic will bring bad karma points. 94 Slashdot readers can
then decide to filter their comments so that the posts of users with bad karma
profiles will not appear on their screens. To be sure, some intelligent or funny
comments will be suppressed through this system. Even a blind hog finds an
93. The account presented here is similar to an account of how MySpace went from "cool" to
"lame" as its user base expanded. See Aman Batheja, Overgrown Online: MySpace's Meteoric
Growth Might Be Its Own Undoing, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 14, 2006, at 1F.
94. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 76-80.
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acorn now and again. Still, Slashdot's system is elegant, if cumbersome and
underinclusive.
The Slashdot experience might not be generalizable, however. The karma
system does a fine job of dealing with the occasional annoying troll, but a few
dozen trolls, working together to rate each other's posts positively, could
threaten the karma system. This objection has proven not to be an issue for
Slashdot, which bills itself as a source of "news for nerds" and benefits from
self-selection among its readers, who tend to be relatively intelligent and
predisposed toward cooperation in the site's karma-scoring system. 95
Moreover, Slashdot has no natural predators. Because it threatens neither the
business model of a large firm nor the ideological interests of a well-organized
interest group, there is little chance of a coordinated attack on its karma
system. The same cannot be said for other socially produced resources, which
means that the Slashdot model might have limited applicability. Indeed, the
modus operandi of websites like Digg.com, which uses a reputation system
similar to Slashdot's, has been threatened by commercial interests using
kickbacks to ensure that articles about their products are promoted by Digg
users with very strong reputations.96
Wikipedia, another socially produced resource, has faced several distinct
types of threats. The primary threats consisted of pranksters and ideologues.
The former wished to reduce the encyclopedia's accuracy as a way of having
fun. The latter wished to alter the encyclopedia's content as a way of spreading
their own beliefs about controversial subjects. Wikipedia has been able to
mitigate these problems through a series of governance rules: barring
anonymous edits and flagging as "controversial" material that was subject to
frequent revision and re-revision. Wikipedia has also faced a threat much like
the one that posed legal headaches for peer-to-peer networks: plagiarism by
Wikipedia authors. Here, Wikipedia has relied on its readers to identify and
police instances of plagiarism.97 Wikipedia has had a somewhat easier time
with this problem than have the peer-to-peer networks, for understandable
reasons. Without the widespread availability of unlicensed copies of media
content, few people would be interested in using peer-to-peer networks.
9s. A slogan like "news for nerds" is a nice illustration of the "exclusionary vibe," whereby
language is used to create a focal point for like-minded users. For a fuller discussion, see
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights To Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1835, 1850-57 (2006).
96. See Dan Mitchell, Stuffing the Electronic Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2o6, at C5.
97. See Wikipedia: Copyright Problems, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Copyright-
problems (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
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Wikipedia, however, would still provide an attractive resource even if all of its
infringing content were removed.
Now suppose that Encyclopedia Britannica determined that Wikipedia's
success was cutting into Britannica's profit margins. Suppose that the makers
of Britannica began hiring people to implant objective errors into Wikipedia's
text that might not get corrected by Wikipedia's editors but that would make
some people who relied on those erroneous entries look foolish. Britannica
might defeat Wikipedia's accreditation controls by hiring others to affirm the
correctness of erroneous entries. To the best of my knowledge, this has not
happened, and Britannica might suffer substantial reputational sanctions in the
publishing industry if it tried this approach. Indeed, there might be legal
liability for Britannica too, perhaps under an unfair competition cause of
action. 98 This hypothetical Britannica example does have a real-world
analogue, though. It is a close cousin to the strategy adopted by the Recording
Industry Association of America against the peer-to-peer file swapping
networks. In a process called spoofing, the recording industry hired various
third parties to create corrupted versions of sound recordings and upload them
repeatedly to the peer-to-peer networks, where they were passed along by
unsuspecting users. This spoofing practice substantially raised the frustration
costs associated with using the peer-to-peer networks and may have driven
many users toward iTunes and other outlets for licensed copies of mp3 sound
recordings. 99 In short, even social producers like Wikipedia that have not been
confronted with well-organized, malicious campaigns can expect to encounter
them as they pose increasing threats to the business models of proprietary
firms.
B. Excess Capacity as Profit Opportunity
If Benkler's prognostications about the future are right, then social
production will increasingly take "market share" away from firms following
proprietary models. Benkler's analysis of how proprietary firms will respond
focuses almost exclusively on their likely lobbying efforts, but their responses
in the marketplace may be more potent than their legislative efforts. Some
firms, like Britannica, will respond to the challenge by trying to build a better
proprietary product or by informing consumers about the pros and cons of the
98. Wikipedia's status as a nonprofit entity might not be fatal to its pursuit of an intentional
interference with business advantage cause of action. See Am. Baptist Churches v. Galloway,
71o N.Y.S.2d 12, 15-17 (App. Div. 2000).
99. See Strahilevitz, supra note 89, at 585.
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proprietary and socially produced products. Other firms, like those in the
recording industry, will attack their social production foes directly, through
spoofing-like strategies.
There is a third type of strategy against social production that we can
expect clever firms to pursue. Suppose that projects like SETI@home
ultimately eat into the sales of IBM and other supercomputers. How might
IBM respond? Recall Benkler's argument that large-scale social production can
only arise when excess capacity exists in the system. Lots of people have extra
computing resources and no ability to do anything with those resources, so
they are all too happy to donate those resources to the search for little green
men, a malaria cure, or whatnot. But suppose a new firm, Acme Networking,
entered the market: Acme pays PC owners for their excess computing resources
and then aggregates these resources for sale to proprietary pharmaceutical
firms or defense contractors. A PC owner would now face a choice: she could
download the SETI@home screensaver and give away her excess capacity, or
she could sell that excess capacity to Acme for $3, $5, or $15 a month. A few
people would still donate their excess capacity, but many more would now sell
it to Acme.
Benkler responds by arguing that the transaction costs of negotiating a
contract between Acme and computer owners would exceed Acme's potential
to profit from this arrangement.' I am not completely convinced,'' but even
if Benkler is right, it is easy to imagine next-generation computing devices
profoundly altering the calculus in a way that empowers the Acmes of the
world. Excess capacity exists on PCs because a user can access data off his
personal hard drive more quickly than he can access data from a remote server.
But the rise of networked computing and broadband connections has
substantially reduced the discrepancy between these methods of retrieving
data. Further reductions in that differential could make the individual PC hard
drive a thing of the past, thanks to economies of scale. As soon as that happens,
it is easy to imagine firms offering computer users a pricing scheme that
1oo. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 82-83, 109-10.
ioi. Benkler currently has the facts on his side, noting that "[o]nly two of about sixty projects
active in 2004 were built on a pay-per-contribution basis, and these were quite small-scale
by comparison to many of the others." Id. at 83. Still, one wonders why Berkeley did not just
offer a $i million reward to the user whose computer happened to be the one that
performed the calculations enabling Berkeley astronomers to notice the first signs of
extraterrestrial life. Paying such a bounty would have been unlikely to "crowd out" altruistic
contributions to the project, and the associated transaction costs would have been miniscule.
Perhaps the early movers in distributed computing were unlikely to be proprietary firms
because the stakes initially seemed too low, or perhaps nonprofit entities ran into too much
red tape when they contemplated paying for contributions.
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charges them for the amount of data that they actually process, not the amount
of data that their system might store and access if operating at capacity. "Extra"
hard drive space and processor capacity could become a relic of the past within
the next decade.
Benkler's analysis of social production, then, implies that money is being
left on the table. When there is money on the table, startups like Acme
eventually figure out ways to grab it. And, in this case, proprietary firms facing
competition from social producers would have an incentive to underwrite
Acme's entry into the marketplace. How would SETI@home respond to this
challenge? It's hard to say. It might start paying people for their excess
capacity. But at that point, it would no longer be in the social production
"business." It might survive with fewer contributions. But then it would no
longer look like the wave of the future. Rather, it would exist as a nice way for
a small, self-selecting group of do-gooders to donate a resource that most
people managed to sell.
In essence, by identifying excess capacity as a key ingredient to social
production, Benkler has simultaneously pointed to social production's Achilles
heel. Where we observe excess capacity, and social production is the only thing
exploiting that capacity, a market opportunity exists. Once excess capacity
becomes significant enough to engender substantial opportunities for doing
good in the world, social production projects will face real competition from
proprietary firms over that capacity. At present, computer users' excess capacity
remains largely untapped by the proprietary market. But make no mistake: this
is a temporary situation, sure to change as technology evolves.
We are already seeing proprietary firms tap the sort of excess human capital
that drives Wikipedia. Amazon has launched the "Mechanical Turk,""0 2 a
"crowdsourcing" website that pays volunteers amounts ranging from a penny
to several dollars for performing tasks that cannot be automated on a cost-
effective basis.1"3 Crowdsourcing entrepreneurs see their sites as a threat to
Wikipedia and social networking websites at which users receive no monetary
rewards for their contributions." 4 Of course, writing a Wikipedia entry may be
more fun than responding to a survey, identifying faces in a photograph, or
transcribing audio clips - tasks currently assigned to Mechanical Turk workers.
Despite this, the website seems to attract "hobbyists" not too different from the
lo2. Amazon Mechanical Turk, http://www.mturk.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
1o3. Gregory M. Lamb, When Workers Turn into "Turkers," CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 2,
2006, at 13.
104. See id.
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amateurs who would contribute to Wikipedia. ' Indeed, competition from
websites like Metacafe, which pays amateur video producers for content, has
prompted YouTube to announce a revealing about-face; it will begin paying its
more successful video content creators later this year. ,6
The initial success of Mechanical Turk in paying people to contribute labor
via the Internet raises one glaring question. Why hasn't my hypothetical Acme
Corporation entered the market for excess physical capacity? In reality, a
variant of the Acme business model has developed, though on an in-kind,
rather than cash, basis. Aptly enough, it is the Acme model that has made peer-
to-peer file swapping application development a potentially profitable
enterprise. The business method pursued by Kazaa, Morpheus, and many
other developers of peer-to-peer applications depended on bundling those
desirable applications with undesirable spyware. 1°7 Users sometimes had to opt
out of installing the spyware along with the peer-to-peer applications and other
times lacked opt-out or uninstallation opportunities."' Spyware currently
infects approximately 90% of all Internet-connected computers, and most
computer users are unaware that spyware is running in the background,
monitoring their online activities.' 9 Spyware did two things: it tracked the
online activities of people on whose computers it had been installed, and it
absorbed large quantities of the users' excess computing capacity to do so. On
many machines, bundled peer-to-peer spyware dramatically reduced available
computing resources."' Some spyware programs sucked away not only excess
capacity, but necessary capacity that users relied on for basic applications,
resulting in system crashes."'
Benkler's book is plainly conflicted about the use of peer-to-peer
applications. He loves the technology but disapproves of its use for the
purposes of copyright infringement." 2 Yet the untold story of peer-to-peer
1o5. See id.
1o6. Bob Tedeschi, New Hot Properties: YouTube Celebrities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2007, at C1.
107. See Martin Boldt et al., Exploring Spyware Effects 6 (2004), http://psi.bth.se/mbo/
exploring-spyware-effects-nordsec2004.pdf
1o8. See Laxma Nandikonda, Users Should Be Concerned of Spyware in Free P2P Software 3-5
(Apr. 26-27, 2005), http://www.tm1.tkk.fi/Publications/C/i8/nandikonda.pdf.
iog. See Boldt et al., supra note 107, at 2, 4.
11o. See id. at 4.
iii. See Nandikonda, supra note 1o8, at 5.
112. Compare Benkler's generally positive account of peer-to-peer technology on artists'
pocketbooks and on information dissemination generally, see BENKLER, supra note 3, at 418-
29, with his statements that "[p] eer-to-peer file sharing includes many instances of outright
illegality practiced by tens of millions of Internet users," id. at 470, and that the plaintiffs'
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networking is spyware bundling. There is no such thing as a free lunch, at least
not after Napster. Users who downloaded unlicensed copies of mp3 sound
recordings were paying for those files just as iTunes users were. The latter paid
with cash, the former paid with computing resources, and many a functional
PC was rendered virtually inoperable by bundled spyware and malware.
Indeed, bundled spyware also imposed costs on social producers like
SETI@home, by reducing the excess computing capacity that could be
donated to worthy distributed computing projects.
There is a second wrinkle in the Acme story. This part of the story actually
has to do with the weaknesses of intellectual property protection. Suppose that
Merck wanted to purchase excess computing capacity from me, you, and others
for the purposes of modeling new vaccines and crunching assorted numbers
relating to the development of a new drug. This distributed-computing-based
research and development would take place before Merck filed a patent
application or sought FDA approval for its innovation. By contracting out
computational tasks to numerous computers, Merck would be exposing ideas
that could be misappropriated by a competitor firm, such as Pfizer, which
might then seek to beat Merck to the punch and patent Merck's innovation out
from under it. Contributing one or two computers to Merck's project would
not permit Pfizer to glean much about Merck's research agenda. But analyzing
the data from a few dozen computers might provide Pfizer with very valuable
information.113
In principle, the law might protect Merck in these circumstances. If it turns
out that Pfizer was able to reverse engineer Merck's new cancer therapy based
on information gleaned from computer users' providing Merck with excess
capacity, then Pfizer might be liable for trade secret misappropriation. Or it
might not. A court could well hold that by disclosing proprietary information
to strangers, Merck had failed to exercise the "reasonable precautions" that are
the sine qua non of trade secret protection.1 4 Alternatively, even if Merck tried
to protect itself by writing contracts that forbade users from peeking at the data
that their machines were crunching, it would be relatively easy for Pfizer to
cover its tracks, convincing a court that it arrived at the insights relating to
claims in the peer-to-peer litigation "seemed the most morally compelling" of the creative
industry's various efforts to curtail social production, id. at 471.
113. For example, firms can gain a substantial market advantage by learning not only about a
competitor's successful innovations, but also about "negative knowledge" -unsuccessful
dead ends that a competitor invested in and then abandoned. For that reason, the law
protects information about these dead ends as trade secrets. See On-Line Techs., Inc. v.
Perkin-Elmer Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 313, 323-24, 333 (D. Conn. 2003).
114. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179-8o (7th Cir. 1991).
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Merck's line of research through legally permissible independent invention and
not by inducing contractual breaches. Intellectual property law thus might help
explain not only social production, but the puzzling persistence of excess
capacity as well. Nonprofit entities seeking to find extraterrestrial life do not
need to worry too much about "competitors" misappropriating their findings
via participation in a distributed computing project. Proprietary firms should,
by contrast, worry a great deal about trade secret misappropriation.
C. If You Can't Beat Them, Appropriate Their Methods
At the close of 2006, Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales made a telling
announcement. He would be launching Wikiasari, a search engine that relied
on human volunteers to help point computer users to the most relevant web
pages. Wikiasari users who disagreed with the search engine's ranking of
relevant responses to a query could propose an alternative ranking, which
would then remain in effect until another user changed it."' Wikiasari would
closely resemble Wikipedia in that respect. There would be a crucial difference,
though. Whereas Wikipedia is run by the nonprofit Wikimedia Foundation,
Wikiasari would be managed by Wikia, a for-profit firm. Wikia had already
begun raising seed money from investors, following a well-worn dot-com
path. 116
Though Berkeley's SETI@home and Wikipedia itself remain
nonproprietary, many of the examples of social production that Benkler
provides resemble Wikiasari in that they were organized by, and remain
controlled by, profit-seeking firms. Benkler's examples of social production
include Linden Lab, a proprietary software firm that developed Second Life,
the massive multi-user online game in which users create much of the virtual
world that players encounter;"17 IBM, which has turned Linux-related service
contracts into a major revenue stream;"' and Google, which has built a
powerful search engine based on its own users' judgments of what search
results are click-worthy." 9
But these examples only scratch the surface. A large number of proprietary
firms have duplicated Linden Lab's strategy of convincing their user bases to
115. Noam Cohen, Something Wiki Is Coming to the Web Search Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007,
at C5.
116. Id.
117. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 74-75.
118. See id. at 46-47.
119. See id. at 76.
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engage in social production in service of the firms' bottom lines. MySpace has
become a profitable social networking site with a successful business model,
having convinced over 70 million users to create engaging content for free and
having placed ads alongside that content.'2 ° YouTube follows a similar
business model, pairing user-created video content with advertisements.
Tripadvisor.com collects a wealth of information from its users about hotels,
restaurants, airlines, and travel destinations, and then makes money by linking
up users with the vendors being reviewed. Netflix collects millions of user
evaluations of films and books, and then offers personalized recommendations
to its users based on the predilections of those with similar tastes. 2 ' Netflix
also offers a "Friends" feature that allows users to see what DVDs their friends
have watched and how well they liked them.'22 iTunes lets users post and share
lists of favorite songs-a new and improved version of a functionality that
originally appeared on Napster. And the granddaddy of them all, eBay, has
become enormously profitable thanks to a socially produced system of feedback
rankings, whereby users evaluate each other's honesty, promptness, and
courteousness.
Collectively, these examples suggest that social production is as likely to
become a tool of market production as a competitor to it."3 There is little
reason to think that nonprofit entities will outcompete proprietary firms using
the same decentralized, user-oriented production methods. This analysis
suggests that some of the content that is currently socially produced will be
brought back within the Coasean firm. For example, it is easy to imagine an
ad-supported online encyclopedia, with some of its ad revenues diverted
toward fact-checking and policing vandalism, displacing Wikipedia.
Proprietary variants of open source programs are also easy to imagine, with
firms making their source code available online and providing cash bounties to
any contributor who can generate more elegant code or fix bugs. The
nonproprietary sector may have been where social production first succeeded,
120. See Saul Hansell, Making Friends Was Easy. Big Profit Is Tougher.: MySpace Is Ready for Its
Members To Meet Advertisers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 3 (Sunday Business), at i.
121. Benkler discusses this phenomenon in the context of Amazon.com. See BENKLER, supra note
3, at 75.
122. It turns out that my colleague Adam Cox and I enjoy many of the same movies, with Netflix
quantifying our tastes as "72% similar."
123. Cf. Lerner & Tirole, supra note 22, at 223-27 (discussing the efforts of various proprietary
firms to benefit from open source programming projects or appropriate open source
methods of production); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 183 (2004) (observing that proprietary firms sometimes make strategic
dedications to the public domain, so as to head off privatization of a collective resource and
prevent the welfare losses that might result from an anticommons).
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but the proprietary sector seems as likely to be the place where decentralized
user production is perfected. Indeed, Nefflix recently pursued just such a
strategy, offering a million-dollar bounty to anyone who could help the
company improve the accuracy of its algorithm for recommending films based
on socially produced movie ratings.1"
If social production becomes a tool that is primarily employed by propriety
firms, then it might no longer be appropriate to treat social production as a
distinct analytical category. 2 ' To be sure, Linden Labs makes more money
when a Second Life user creates a character or image that other users find
compelling, and Netflix makes more money when its customers supply reliable
movie ratings. Yet profit-seeking enterprises relied on their customers to create
value long before the Internet was launched. A nightclub with a reputation for
having stylish patrons attracts more paying customers. A real estate
development reputed to have neighborly residents sees its property values rise.
The rise of Second Life is in a sense not so different from the rise (and fall) of
Studio 54.
III. THE PROGRESSIVITY OF NETWORKS
Benkler's application of transaction cost analysis to social production is a
theme that was richly developed in his outstanding earlier work. 26 The really
new and exciting part of The Wealth of Networks is Benkler's chapter on
information policy as a tool for promoting global development. Here, Benkler
champions social production as an effective force for closing the wealth gap
that divides rich nations and people from poor nations and people." 7 To that
end, he argues on behalf of numerous legal and political changes that will
unleash the forces of social production, leaving the global economy
transformed."28
124. See Neflix Offers $i Million Prize for Better Recommendations, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 3, 20o6, at 3.
For earlier examples of this sort of behavior by proprietary firms, see Hilmar Schmundt,
Using the Internet To Solve R&D Problems, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Dec. 19, 2005,
http ://www.spiegel.de/intemational/spiegel/o,1518,392o55,oo.html.
12s. Recall Benkler's apparent definition of social production supra text accompanying note 6.
126. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 45; Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of
Information Production, 22 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 81 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely:
On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114
YALE L.J. 273 (2004).
127. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 3, at 308.
128. See id. at 317-55, 383-456.
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Benkler's claims here are both categorical and specific. At the broadest
level, Benkler notes the propensity for socially produced resources to be made
available free of charge, enabling the poor to access basic information and
marketplaces, which they would be unable to do if forced to pay, as is typically
the case for proprietary resources. 29 More concretely, Benkler submits that
social production has enormous potential to help the poor obtain life's
necessities, such as pharmaceuticals and genetically engineered seeds,' 30 as well
as tools such as free software and educational texts that can help them compete
in a global economy. 3 '
Benkler's bold analysis runs into two major problems here, however. First,
as proprietary firms increasingly employ the means used by social producers,
we will see them roll out social production technologies that seem poised to
divide the rich and the poor, rather than bring them together. Socially
produced reputation systems seem as commercially promising as any of the
socially produced resources that Benkler discusses, and these reputation
systems' primary function is to reward the trustworthy and punish the
untrustworthy. As society increasingly comes to rely on reputation and
feedback, as the reliability of these mechanisms improves, and as reputations
become transportable across platforms and applications, bad reputations will
ensure that untrustworthy or discourteous people become and remain poor. At
the same time, there is a real possibility that trustworthy and courteous
residents of the developing world will have trouble succeeding in the global
marketplace because of reputation-weighting measures designed to combat the
fraudulent feedback problem.
Second, while Benkler is extremely well versed in transaction cost
economics, his book neglects to grapple with a more recent, but nearly as
important, development in law and economics: optimal redistribution analysis.
Though facilitating growth in the developing world is a goal that policymakers
should pursue, the literature on redistribution should make us wonder whether
i29. See id. at 307. Some proprietary firms make their products available for free. These include
ad-supported television broadcasters and online auctioneers like eBay (which charges no fee
to buyers and takes a small cut out of sales prices). Indeed, it is plausible that eBay alone has
helped lift more poor people out of poverty than the various social production projects
Benkler has identified. The fact that eBay charges sellers a commission does not exclude the
poor from participating in it, and the ambitious, small-time merchant probably does much
better selling on eBay than she would do selling her wares on a socially produced auction
site that did not charge a sales commission but, as a result, was less well run and did not
have eBay's enormous base of buyers.
130. See id. at 311.
131. See id. at 320-28.
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better tools than the ones Benkler has identified are available. Let us take these
two arguments in order.
A. Reputation and Meritocracy
It is impossible to evaluate social production's net effect on economic
inequality and global development without more fully understanding the
socially produced resources that already exist or will be developed in the
coming years. Reputation scoring is among the most important forms of social
production to emerge in the last decade. Reputation scores are a socially
produced resource under almost any definition- users of a network provide
feedback about the performance of other network members and typically do
not receive payment or other rewards in exchange for contributing to this
valuable public good. eBay's feedback system has arguably revolutionized our
economy as much as Linux and other open source programming projects have.
In the coming years, we should expect to see the development of software
applications that merge eBay-style feedback rankings with MySpace-style
social networking capabilities. Current feedback systems will soon seem
antiquated, and overall feedback scores like eBay's will be replaced with far
more fine-grained data, allowing me to ask, for example, how well fellow
University of Chicago professors or Berkley alumni rated a particular real estate
agent, hair stylist, or tour guide. The rise of "wearable communities" might
allow us to evaluate the reputations of strangers we encounter in public far
more accurately than is currently possible.'32 It seems plausible that within a
short period of time, all of us, not just eBay sellers or restaurants, will be
ranked and rated by our peers, and these reputation scores will be
transportable across platforms, be they online or offline.
These socially produced ubiquitous reputation systems stand poised to
generate enormous wealth. After all, they can help us reward the trustworthy
and collectively deter or sanction the devious or opportunistic. Ubiquitous
feedback networks will allow us to move beyond inaccurate snap judgments
that lead us to trust someone or not based on her race, apparel, accent, name,
or beauty. At the same time, these technologies could help ensure the
persistence of a reputational underclass. Social production stands poised to
make the structure of societal relations far more transparent than it currently is,
132. See Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 93, 112-15, 134-36 (2005); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" for
Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1699, 1761 n.231 (2006).
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and that transparency will facilitate forms of exclusion that are not currently
possible.
In short, it is impossible to characterize the distributional consequences of
social production without knowing more about the extent to which society will
embrace socially produced ubiquitous feedback networks. If they succeed in
weeding out false or biased feedback, such networks will reward merit,
character, business savvy, and charm, in the process engendering both upward
and downward mobility. At present, failures in the reputation information
"marketplace" inappropriately prop up the undeserving rich and keep down
the deserving poor. The implication for economic inequality seems clear in a
world of accurate and ubiquitous socially produced reputation. Because there
will always be people with deservedly poor reputations, there will always be
poor people.'33
Some of this stratification is laudable. When a down-on-his luck conman
cheats a well-off but naive senior citizen out of half of her retirement savings,
we hardly want to applaud the wealth transfer for its progressivity. A chief
advantage of well-functioning reputation and feedback systems is that they
help solidify trust in the marketplace and encourage people to behave honestly
and courteously. These benefits should be sufficient to alleviate our guilt about
the effects that such systems have on the irredeemably dishonest and
discourteous people among us. So whereas social production on the whole
might increase economic inequality, its tendency to do so on meritocratic
grounds should hardly render us hostile to the growth of social production.
One big question mark concerns the extent to which people in the
developing world will be able to benefit from these socially produced
reputation networks. An obvious shortcoming in the eBay feedback system is
that all feedback is weighted equally. While eBay's approach is in a sense more
democratic, this weighting system ultimately makes feedback ratings less
reliable. Second-generation reputation systems will assign more weight to
feedback from users who themselves have received lots of positive feedback and
133. Benkler's discussion of inequality begins with a survey of justice theories put forth by John
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 303-08.
Benkler contrasts Rawls with Dworkin by arguing that Dworkin's theory tolerates
inequality that results from individuals' personal choices and Rawls's does not. See id. at
304. To the extent that socially produced reputation systems penalize those who make bad
choices, this outcome may be tolerable under a Dworkinian framework and intolerable
under a Rawlsian framework. At the very least, however, increased reliance on reputation
systems could undercut Benkler's claim that "[t]he networked information economy
improves justice from the perspective of every single one of these theories of justice." Id. at
305.
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less weight to feedback from users with weaker reputations.3 4 These same
systems will allow me to assign extra weight to people whom I know, who are
friends-of-friends, or who have some of the same institutional affiliations as
me. These advances will be useful, but they may make it more difficult for an
honest, capable entrepreneur in the developing world to attain the reputation
capital necessary to trade with wealthy individuals in the developed world. If
developing world residents encounter initially hostile feedback from westerners
thanks to differing commercial norms or old-fashioned prejudices, 3 ' and this
initial feedback scares away potential customers in the developed world, then
reputation networks could ossify existing global wealth disparities.
The discussion so far has focused on the use of reputation systems in
commercial settings. In the past year or so, a few developments have suggested
the possibility of a new kind of social production revolution, one that employs
that method of production to strengthen the enforcement of formal laws and
informal norms. The Texas "virtual minutemen" project 36 may be an early
sign of what is to come. An enterprising entrepreneur in New York City has
allowed parents to slap "How's My Nanny?" stickers on the backs of strollers,
so that concerned citizens can report nanny misconduct to the parents of the
affected children. 37 The Cincinnati Bengals football team has implemented a
social production scheme to help maintain order at its games. Fans who
witness hooliganism or rowdy behavior can call a telephone number and report
it to stadium authorities, who will use cameras mounted all over the stadium to
zoom in on the site of the report, verify the conduct, and take action against the
offenders.13 8 Similar Internet-based enterprises have sprung up recently to
monitor, shame, and deter litterbugs, people who park illegally in disabled
134. See Bin Yu & Munindar P. Singh, A Social Mechanism of Reputation Management in Electronic
Communities, in COOPERATIVE INFORMATION AGENTS IV: THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION
AGENTS IN CYBERSPACE 154, 158 (Matthias Klusch & Larry Kerschberg eds., 2000).
135. Cf Mark J.F. Lund & Steven McGuire, Institutions and Development: Electronic Commerce and
Economic Growth, 26 ORG. STUD. 1743, 1753 (2005) ("As two studies of the South African
furniture industry note, the existence of websites, and the willingness of managers to break
into international markets, tells only part of the story. International customers often make
demands in terms of product and support service quality that domestic customers do not
make. The latter point is particularly important, for it draws attention to the human capital
requirements for successful e-commerce.").
136. See supra text accompanying note i.
137. See Catherine Elsworth, Pushchair Plates Spell Trouble for Bad Nannies, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 21, 2006, at 6.
138. See Barrett J. Brunsman, Bengals Get Tough on Boorish Fans, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 8,
2006, atAi.
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parking spots, and newspaper thieves.139 These developments have not gone
unnoticed in the legal academy. A young professor at a respectable school
recently proposed the launch of a compulsory new social production system
that would police aggressive and inconsiderate driving on urban roadways by
requiring the installation of "How's My Driving?" stickers on all passenger
vehicles. 14o
The enforcement of social norms has always been somewhat puzzling in
light of the costs of sanctioning norm violators. Just as technology has
facilitated the social production of creative content, these developments seem
poised to facilitate the social production of law and norm enforcement. As a
result, laws and norms will be enforced more efficiently, and those who violate
laws or norms will be more readily identifiable. These sorts of developments
may be worth applauding (or not) 14' but it is difficult to argue that they will
reduce inequality. It seems much more likely that by assisting in the
identification and sanctioning of those who break the law or violate widely
shared social norms, reputation and decentralized law enforcement systems
will contribute to social and economic stratification.
B. Bill Gates Has Shoulders Too: Optimal Redistribution and Social Production
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the equality-promoting
tendencies of social production that Benkler has identified trump the
inequality-promoting tendencies that I have identified. Should we, as Benkler
argues, promote economic equality by promoting social production? We can
turn to the law and economics literature to help answer that question.
In 1994, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell published an important article in
the Journal of Legal Studies arguing that distributive justice goals should be
furthered not through the adoption of legal rules designed to help the poor,
but through the tax system.'42  Their argument was elegant and
straightforward: "[E]ven though the income tax distorts work incentives, any
139. See Jennifer Saranow, The Snoop Next Door, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2007, at W1.
140. See Strahilevitz, supra note 132. This "How's My Driving?" regime depends on excess
capacity-the extra time and attention that motorists stuck in gridlock or stopped at red
lights can devote to reporting misconduct by fellow drivers.
141. I explore that question and examine how the legal doctrine should respond to the rise of
ubiquitous reputation networks in an in-progress paper. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Feedback (2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
142. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an
efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system designed so that every
person is made better off.1 43 Whenever the law embraces an inefficient legal
rule for the sake of redistribution, resources are left on the table, and society is
worse off than it otherwise might be.' 44 Put another way, the tax system
inevitably distorts less than legal rules do. While the tax system distorts
incentives to work, an inefficient legal rule distorts labor incentives to the same
degree, while simultaneously distorting incentives to engage in the conduct
regulated by the legal rule. Although Kaplow and Shavell's argument has been
criticized by law and economics scholars, 14 it has held up rather well - so much
so that many scholars now essentially take its conclusion for granted.46
143. Id. at 669 (emphasis omitted).
144. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling has argued that this inefficiency may be tolerable in the
copyright context because of the positive expressive externalities that result from speech. See
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1576-78
(2005). Essentially, she argued that society as a whole may be better off if a potential
dissident expresses himself than if the dissident is bought off through a transfer payment,
even if the dissident would prefer the cash to the expressive opportunity. See id. Whatever
the merits of this argument in the domestic political context, it rings hollow in the global
context, and Van Houweling has indicated a willingness to extend her argument beyond the
borders of the nation-state. The global version of Van Houweling's argument would be that
an impoverished speaker may prefer to spend his money on food or medicine, but people in
foreign countries would benefit more from his expression than his health, so he should not
be able to accept payments for food or medicine in lieu of exercising his speech rights.
145. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income
Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1125 (2004); Chris William
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
146. Cf Avraham et al., supra note 145, at 1127 ("In the mid-199os, in what has come to be
considered a classic article, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell made what seemed to be a
decisive argument regarding the use of redistribudve legal rules. They argued that income
redistribution is always more efficiently accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system,
even if the contracting-around and haphazardness issues are placed aside."); Thomas S.
Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Law and
Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 35, 52 (2004) ("[I]n a series of articles and now in
an important book, Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell have been arguing that it is more
efficient to use the tax-and-transfer system than common law rules to redistribute income.
This is an important claim that, in fact, has been and deserves to be taken seriously. And the
claims of Fairness Versus Welfare are so extraordinarily far-reaching that the book has been
and will continue to be reviewed extensively. My point is that this is not ideological
advocacy on the part of Kaplow and Shavell; it is serious and important scholarship.").
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Kaplow and Shavell's basic argument has been applied to intellectual
property 47 and international legal rules,' 48 among other things.
We should apply this principle to Benkler's argument in two different
ways. First, if the strong version of Benkler's empirical claim is right, and legal
rules promoting social production are quite likely per se superior to legal rules
promoting market production, then Benkler's analysis in chapter nine is
unnecessary. The law should just embrace the purportedly efficient legal rules
that Benkler has identified 149 and trust that doing so will create wealth that can
make both the haves and the have-nots better off. If it turns out that social
production promoting rules are wealth-maximizing but regressive, then society
should redistribute some of the newly generated wealth to those made worse
off by such rules.
If, however, the strongest version of Benkler's empirical conclusion is
wrong, and legal rules that promote social production at the expense of
proprietary production are sometimes inefficient, then by embracing those
rules society could hinder economic progress in the developing world.
Assuming social-production-promoting rules are wealth-diminishing but
progressive, legislators and judges should instead adopt the most efficient legal
rule and then promote redistribution of the surplus resources from the haves to
the have-nots. This redistribution should be accomplished via the most
efficient mechanism -direct transfer payments to the poor, regardless of where
they live - or, as a second-best alternative, trade policies that are tailored to
benefit poor countries.
There is likely a knee-jerk response to this second, more interesting,
application of Kaplow and Shavell to Benkler. Namely, even if such wealth
redistribution could occur, creating a Pareto-superior state of affairs, in reality it
is unlikely to occur, resulting in a mere Kaldor-Hicks improvement over the
inefficient but fairer pro-social-production legal rule. But it is not so crazy to
imagine these transfers taking place. Such redistribution is occurring as you
read these words.
The name "Bill Gates" does not appear in The Wealth of Networks, but his is
the face most associated with the rise of the information economy. The world's
richest person earned that title largely as a result of the incentives created by
the intellectual property system. Gates and his spouse have announced that
147. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 33, 70-71 (2004).
148. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures To Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 216o-61 (1995).
149. See BENKLER, supra note 3, at 383-459.
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they intend to devote the vast majority of their wealth to the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation. That entity already has become the world's largest
charitable foundation, with a $33 billion endowment as of December 31,
2oo6,150 and it has made fighting global poverty and disease its top priority. '
It seems unlikely that we can get more redistributive bang for our buck by
tweaking intellectual property rules to promote social production than we can
get by keeping the existing rules and facilitating the Gates Foundation's
acquisition of an enormous pot of money to spend on the most promising anti-
poverty programs it can identify. Assuming that social-production-promoting
rules are not inherently more efficient than legal rules that promote market
production, targeted assistance should dominate roundabout benefits.
The Gates Foundation example shows the complexity of the issues raised
by chapter nine of Benkler's book. If we accept Benkler's premise that
narrowing the gap between people in the developed and developing worlds is a
moral imperative, but we are skeptical about Benkler's empirical claim that
rules promoting social production are quite likely to be Pareto superior to rules
promoting market production, then we must decide how best to further a
laudable objective. It may well be that the adoption of efficient rules promoting
market production is the best course of action because those rules enable the
Microsofts of the world to amass enormous financial resources, which they
then can and sometimes do redistribute in the service of the developing world.
Failing that, tax-and-transfer policies and trade liberalization seem more likely
to do the trick than altering domestic intellectual property laws.
Of course, there is nothing to guarantee that Bill and Melinda Gates will
continue to devote their wealth to fighting global disease and poverty. They
might donate their money to college athletic departments or well-endowed
prep schools, as some other wealthy people do. But the same is true for social
production. Much like tofu, social production has no taste of its own. Rather, it
absorbs the preferences and values of its users. If participants in a social
production network want to help keep poor Guatemalans from entering the
rich United States in search of enhanced economic opportunities, they can do
15o. Bill & Melinda Gates Found., Foundation Fact Sheet, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
MediaCenter/FactSheeti (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
151. See Editorial, Giving Rich Guys a Good Name: Buffett and Gates Conjure a Brilliant
Philanthropic Merger, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRU3., July 1, 2006, at A18. The recently announced
Google Foundation, Google.org, has also identified fighting poverty around the world as
one of its primary objectives, and it seems particularly focused on fighting infectious
diseases in the developing world. See Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way: Not the Usual,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at Ai.
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so. If computer owners want to spend their time looking for signs of alien life
in outer space, and not disease cures for Earthlings, they can do so.
It is possible that average Joes have stronger abstract preferences for
progressive resource redistribution than do wealthy entrepreneurs." 2 But the
available evidence does not seem to support that hypothesis. Rich Americans
donate a higher percentage of their income to charity than do poor
Americans, ' and the nature of their contributions differs from those of the less
affluent.5 4 Survey evidence suggests relatively progressive goals among the
very rich: multimillionaires identified educational improvements, poverty,
inequality, hunger, affordable housing, and health care for the uninsured as the
policy issues they most wanted to influence through their charitable giving, '
152. The word "abstract" is key here. It should not be surprising if the have-nots are more
favorably disposed to progressive income taxation than the haves, because unlike the haves,
the have-nots would benefit from such redistribution.
153. See John J. Havens et al., Charitable Giving: How Much, by Whom, to What, and How?, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 542, 545-46 (Walter W. Powell & Richard
Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). Of course, this hardly proves that the rich are more
progressive. The rich may donate a higher percentage of their incomes because they have
greater disposable income or because they benefit more from charitable contributions'
signaling function. On the latter, see POSNER, supra note ii, at 65-67; and Amihai Glazer &
Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. lO9 (1996).
154. Poorer Americans overwhelmingly donate to religious organizations, whereas the wealthy
are more likely to direct their money to educational institutions, health care causes, and
human service organizations. Havens et al., supra note 153, at 558. It is not clear whether
secular donations are more progressive (from a wealth redistribution perspective) than
religious donations, and we would want to get a good handle on this data to answer
definitively the comparative progressivity question. The available data suggest that
American religious congregations spend approximately 3% of their annual budgets on
assisting the poor, with expenditures on food, shelter, and clothing being the most common
forms of redistribution. See Mark Cheves & William Tsitsos, Congregations and Social
Services: What They Do, How They Do It, and with Whom, 30 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR O_ 66o, 670-71 (2001). It is worth noting that people often donate money to
educational institutions or hospitals with which their families are not affiliated but rarely
donate money to religious congregations to which they do not belong. This dynamic might
suggest that religious donation is more closely connected with reciprocity than with
progressivity. Cf. Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra
note 153, at 568, 573 (comparing contributions to one's own congregation to "a membership
fee").
155. Paul G. Schervish & John J. Havens, Boston Coll. Soc. Welfare Research Inst., Extended
Report of the Wealth with Responsibility Study 16 (Mar. 2001), http://www.bc.edu/
research/swri/meta-elements/pdf/extendedwwr.pdf.
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though they seemed less committed to the cause of global development,
relative to the Gates Foundation. ,6
Finally, recent research into philanthropic motivations shows that money
that is earned is much more likely to be donated to charity than money that is
obtained via inheritance.5 7 If intellectual property regimes are good at creating
private wealth, then by extension they might be good at promoting progressive
redistributions. In sum, if I have drawn the correct inferences from the
available data, then the people who are made wealthy by exclusive rights to
intellectual property may be more committed to combating resource inequality
than are the millions of ordinary citizens who participate in social productionprojects . s5
CONCLUSION
Ponder for a moment the two stories I recounted at the outset.
The Governor of Texas uses social production to help keep job-seeking
Latin American immigrants from entering the United States. This is an
example of social production being used to reinforce existing economic
inequality.
Telemarketers from the developing world begin using Skype, a VoIP
network that had lowered the cost of voice communications to zero for many
long-distance calls. As a result, Skype users stop accepting calls from people
unknown to them, reducing much of the value of the communications
network. The openness of the Skype network is threatened by the
opportunistic new users, who do not share the values of the network's
preexisting users.
These are two stories of social production, but they are stories with
unhappy endings, at least if the relevant yardsticks are social equality,
openness, and freedom. Such stories do not appear in The Wealth of Networks,
but placing such stories alongside Benkler's sunnier account is essential if we
156. See id. There are problems with this reliance on Paul Schervish and John Havens's study
because it found multimillionaires quite committed to tackling education and social welfare
inequality, but it did not ask them to specify whether they wanted to improve those
problems domestically, internationally, or both.
157. Havens et al., supra note 153, at 554.
158. Cf. id. at 56o ("[T]he high-tech boom of the 199os created a great deal of wealth, especially
among younger donors, whose entrepreneurial, investment orientation shaped the timing
and form of their charitable giving. . . . [M]any recent foundations are the fruit of
entrepreneurial and investment wealth accrued during the high-tech boom of the late[]
1990S.").
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are to understand the changes that social production and noncash market
production will engender in the information age. There is no guarantee that,
even if government stays on the sidelines, nonmarket production will displace
market production as broadly as Benkler envisions. Indeed, serious obstacles
will systematically confront social production enterprises, as if placed there by
some invisible hand.
Let there be no mistaking my bottom line. Any reader will learn a great deal
from Benkler's book, and his synthesis of economics, political theory, and
intellectual property is extremely impressive. This book aspires to, and
deserves, a place in the intellectual property canon. Benkler's analysis of
intellectual property and global development issues is ambitious and will be
profoundly influential. Yet we can learn a lot from this book's imperfections,
too. Among these, two stand out.
First, Benkler seems insufficiendy sensitive to the way selection effects and
competitive pressures will govern the rise and fall of social production.
Whenever social production creates a valuable resource that large numbers of
citizens want to use, that resource becomes an attractive target for the mischief-
makers, proprietary competitors, free-riders, sketchy opportunists, and well-
meaning dolts whose arrival can drive away the cooperators who built the
successful network. Social production networks tend to be open by nature, and
that openness carries with it vulnerability to malicious attacks and proprietary
appropriation. It is premature to write about the success of social production
without analyzing how social production networks can respond to the threats
posed by early successes. Social production in the hands of minutemen,
telemarketers, trolls, and spyware developers is hardly worth celebrating.
Second, Benkler's approach to international development, while
provocative and laudable, seems unduly roundabout and perhaps even
misguided. If, as Benkler sometimes suggests, legal rules favoring social
production are simply more efficient than rules favoring proprietary
production, then Benkler's creative distributional arguments begin to resemble
an academic exercise. But if legal rules that favor proprietary production are
sometimes welfare-maximizing, then Benkler must explain why the standard
assumption of law and economics analysis is inapplicable. Directed wealth
transfers, not blunt legal rules, are presumptively the best means for
accomplishing the ends of wealth redistribution.
These points in conjunction bring us to a rather odd ending place. There is
a lot of economics and not a lot of law in The Wealth of Networks. And yet
Benkler's book could use more of the former and less of the latter. The
important looming threats to social production are basic economic forces, not
legal constructs. If social production is as transformative as Benkler suggests it
is, then the economic realities should alter the political calculus in short order.
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Inefficient incumbent industries can only plug their fingers in the dikes for so
long. But if Benkler's assessment of the economics of social production turns
out to be too rosy, then nonmarket production will remain a fascinating but
peripheral phenomenon that leaves the world mostly untransformed,
regardless of what legislators and judges have to say about the matter.
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